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Abstract
A brief survey of the economics of price dispersion, written for the New Pal-
grave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition.
Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C72, D43, D82, D83.
Price dispersion occurs when diﬀerent sellers oﬀer diﬀerent prices for the same good
in a given market. Thus, it diﬀers from price discrimination under which a single seller
oﬀers diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent groups of buyers or in diﬀerent geographical locations.
A simple explanation for price dispersion is that it arises from imperfect information
on the part of consumers who do not all buy from the lowest price seller because some
at least do not know who the lowest priced seller is. It is an important topic in the field
of the economics of information in that there is considerable empirical evidence that
price dispersion is widespread and significant. Yet, it has proven surprisingly diﬃcult for
economists to derive satisfactory models that support price dispersion as an equilibrium
phenomenon.
The rise of electronic commerce at the end of the 20th century gave new impetus to
empirical studies of pricing behaviour. Baye et al. (2004) analyse detailed information
on prices of 1000 items collected from a price comparison site. Price dispersion is
found to be significant and persistent. Baye et al. finds the an average coeﬃcient of
variation of about 9% for goods being sold online. This is comparable with the results
of Lach (2002) for conventional retailers who finds a lower coeﬃcient for the price of
refrigerators, but higher variation for grocery items such as coﬀee or flour.
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Such empirical work on price dispersion is often disputed on the basis of two argu-
ments, both of which claim that any apparent price dispersion is largely illusory. First,
variance in prices might be explained by hidden heterogeneity in the good being oﬀered
for sale. For example, a retailer that charges high prices might survive not because of
consumer ignorance of cheaper sellers, but because it oﬀers superior service, something
not captured by evidence on prices alone. A second line of scepticism is that dispersion
in posted prices may not be inconsistent with uniformity in prices actually paid. Those
who post high prices may not in fact sell anything. Certainly, one would expect low
priced sellers to sell more than those charging high prices, so that prices weighted by
market share will be less dispersed than if all sellers are given equal weight.
The first criticism is addressed by Baylis and Perloﬀ (2002) who find that, in fact,
some online sellers persistently oﬀer both high prices and poor service. The second is
answered at least in part by Baye et al. (2004) who in their empirical study concentrate
on the diﬀerence between the lowest and second lowest price, rather than the diﬀerence
from lowest to highest or standard deviation, as their measure of dispersion. Further-
more, their data comes from a price comparison site where listings are costly for sellers.
Why pay to list a price at which you think there will be no sales?
In any case, it is certainly possible to construct theoretical models in which prices
are dispersed and yet high prices yield positive sales. Such theory is recent, however.
In an influential survey, Rothschild (1973) identified serious diﬃculties with the then
existing models of price dispersion. At that time, no-one had produced a model where
price dispersion was shown to be the result of equilibrium behaviour. The challenge
was to show that charging a range of prices could be a rational response by sellers to
the search behaviour of consumers, and vice-versa.
It took some years for this challenge to be met. The diﬃculty in doing so is illustrated
by the earlier work of Diamond (1971) who found that once one introduces imperfect
information for consumers, a natural outcome is not price dispersion, but monopoly
pricing by sellers. The essence of Diamond’s result is the following. Suppose there are
a large number of identical buyers who each want to buy one unit of a good from one
of a large number of identical sellers, provided it costs no more than a maximum price
p∗. The buyers know the distribution of prices but each only knows the price currently
being charged by one seller. Each must then must decide whether to learn the price of
one more seller at a fixed cost (imagine searching on foot, or by phoning a succession
of sellers). The optimal search policy in this situation of sequential search is to buy the
first time one sees a price that is equal or below a reservation level r, which varies with
the unit search cost s and distribution of prices F (p). Now, if all consumers have the
same unit search cost, then for a given distribution of prices, they will have the same
reservation price r. The optimal price for all sellers must then be r. But if there is no
dispersion in prices, it cannot be optimal to learn more than one price. Thus, the only
equilibrium is where all sellers charge p∗ and all buyers do not search, even when the
unit cost of search is arbitrarily small. Ironically, this equilibrium satisfies Rothschild’s
criteria. Consumer behaviour is optimal as, when prices are identical, paying to learn
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additional prices is a waste of eﬀort; pricing at the monopoly level is optimal as, when
there is no search, there is no incentive for sellers to cut prices to increase sales.
Not surprisingly, therefore, many of the earliest successful equilibrium price disper-
sion models (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980) take a diﬀerent route from Diamond
and do not assume sequential search. Instead, they are what have been called “clear-
inghouse” models by Baye et al. (2004). By buying a newspaper or by visiting a price
comparison website, a consumer can obtain information about the prices of a number of
sellers all at once. The simplest clearinghouse assumption is that it is possible for con-
sumers to become informed of all current prices. Suppose a proportion q of consumers
remain uninformed and hence pick at a seller at random. The other 1 − q consumers
are informed and only purchase from the lowest priced seller. All consumers wish to
buy one unit of the good if the price does not exceed a common maximum price p∗.
Then, given n sellers and L consumers, if one seller charges a price strictly lower than
all others, she sells to both informed and uninformed, a total of qL/n+ (1− q)L. The
other sellers sell only to the uninformed and expect sales of qL/n. That is, demand is
decreasing but discontinuous in price.
For simplicity, let us follow Varian (1980) and assume that sellers have constant
marginal cost c. There is then no pure strategy equilibrium for sellers as long as there
are both informed and uninformed consumers, that is if q ∈ (0, 1). To see this, note that
if all sellers charged the same price, it would generally be profitable for an individual
to undercut this price in order to attract the informed buyers. However, because of the
presence of uninformed consumers who are not price sensitive, charging the monopoly
price p∗ gives a guaranteed minimum profit of (p∗ − c)qL/n, and so when the prices of
other sellers are close to c, the most profitable price may be p∗. There is a symmetric
mixed equilibrium in which all sellers randomise according to the same continuous
distribution. This mixed equilibrium is a dispersed price equilibrium, as since sellers
randomise over the prices they charge, realised prices will vary over sellers.
However, to have an equilibrium that fully satisfies Rothschild’s challenge, it is nec-
essary to make the consumer’s decision to become informed endogenous. Varian (1980)
assumed diﬀering information costs, with high cost consumers remaining uninformed,
and low cost consumers paying for information. However, Burdett and Judd (1983)
showed that it is possible to close a clearinghouse model even if all buyers have the
same cost s to becoming informed. For example, given the symmetric mixed equilib-
rium described above, consumers who pay to become informed will buy from the lowest
priced seller whose expected price is equal to the expected value of the lowest of n inde-
pendent draws from the equilibrium price distribution. In contrast, those who remain
uninformed expect to pay the simple expectation of the distribution. If q is zero or one,
the equilibrium price distribution will collapse on c or p∗ respectively. However, for in-
terior values of q, the diﬀerence between the price paid by the informed and uninformed
will be positive. Thus, it can be shown that for a value of s suﬃciently low, there is at
least one interior value of q such that the resulting equilibrium distribution of prices is
suﬃciently dispersed such that consumers are indiﬀerent between paying or remaining
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uninformed.
That is, there is at least one internally consistent dispersed price equilibrium. The
proportion of informed consumers generates exactly the right amount of expected price
dispersion such that consumers are indiﬀerent between being informed and uninformed.
It is an elegant but delicate construction. In contrast, the Diamond outcome (no con-
sumers pay to be informed, all firms charge p∗) is a simple pure equilibrium of this game
that coexists with any dispersed price equilibria. Thus the Varian model and the simi-
lar models of Salop and Stiglitz (1983) and of Burdett and Judd (1983) have multiple
equilibria (though the Bertrand outcome where all consumers pay to be informed and
all firms charge marginal cost is not an equilibrium here, consumers have no incentive
to pay to be informed if all prices are the same).
A reasonable question is whether introducing heterogeneity, either under sequential
search or in clearinghouse models, makes dispersed price equilibria more robust. How-
ever, consumer heterogeneity does not remove the Diamond paradox as an alternative
equilibrium. Even if consumers have a range of search costs, if there is no price variation
at all, then there is no incentive to search (unless one makes the implausible assumption
that a mass of consumers have zero search costs). That is, if all sellers share the same
monopoly price, then all charging that price can be an equilibrium if consumer search
is costly. But if instead there is suﬃcient seller heterogeneity, an outcome where all
sellers charge their monopoly price may not be an equilibrium. Suppose no consumer
searches, each seller would then charge her monopoly price. However, suppose all con-
sumers have the same continuous increasing demand function (in contrast to the unit
demand assumed up to now), then a dispersion of costs amongst sellers would lead to
heterogeneity in monopoly prices. This could be suﬃciently diverse so that consumers
would have an incentive to search. Thus, in the equilibrium of Reinganum (1979), low
cost sellers charge their monopoly price, but high cost sellers must charge less than their
monopoly price to make sales.
Finally, when one has heterogeneity of both buyers and sellers, there are two advan-
tages. First, by the above argument, a Diamond-type outcome cannot be an equilibrium
and so uniqueness of the dispersed price equilibrium is possible (Benabou, 1993). Sec-
ond, the dispersed price equilibrium can be pure and strictly monotonic: higher cost
firms charge higher prices. This follows because suﬃcient buyer heterogeneity can make
demand to be everywhere continuous in prices, unlike the discontinuous demand in Var-
ian’s clearinghouse model. For example, if there is a continuum of buyers who search
sequentially and have a continuous density of unit search costs, then there is the possi-
bility of a continuous density of reservation prices. So, demand will increase smoothly
as a seller lowers its price.
What are the major conclusions that can be drawn from these equilibrium models
of price dispersion? The first is that both social and consumer welfare typically are
decreasing with search costs. A reduction in search costs for some consumers can have
a positive externality on other consumers, as increased search brings down prices for
all. Other predictions can sometimes be counterintuitive. For example, an increase in
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the number of sellers actually raises the average price charged in the Varian model.
However, this result does not hold for all price dispersion models. Further, Baye et al.
(2004) find empirically that both average prices and the degree of price dispersion fall
with an increase in seller numbers. Finally, we have seen that models with homogenous
sellers give rise to mixed equilibria, while models with bilateral heterogeneity can gen-
erate pure equilibria. Randomisation over prices would imply regular change in price
order amongst sellers. That is, sometimes a given seller would have the highest price,
sometime the lowest, and sometimes in the middle. A monotone pure equilibrium would
give rise to a stable price ranking. Baylis and Perloﬀ (2002) find that price ranking on
online sales of electronic goods are very stable. In contrast, Lach (2002) finds that price
ranking in data on prices charged by diﬀerent Israeli supermarkets is highly variable.
One possibility is that the diﬀerence arises because Lach’s data are for groceries that
are purchased with greater frequency than the electronic goods in Baylis and Perloﬀ’s
data set. But this highlights that the current theoretical literature on price dispersion
has rarely addressed the related issues of repeat purchases, frequency of purchase and
search patterns that depend on past experience, for example, returning to sellers which
have had low prices before. This would seem the area that is in most the need of further
research.
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